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NOTE
ARE WE KILLING THE WEAK TO
HEAL THE SICK?: FEDERALLY
FUNDED EMBRYONIC STEM CELL
RESEARCH
Alo H. Konsent
MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS have long sought effec-
tive treatments for debilitating diseases and injuries. Until re-
cently, researchers had little concrete hope of significantly help-
ing people afflicted with serious conditions like Parkinson's
disease, diabetes, cancer, multiple sclerosis, birth defects, heart
disease, and spinal cord injuries. Roughly three years ago, eve-
rything changed when scientists made an extremely controver-
sial breakthrough in the field of human stem cell research. Im-
planting these newly isolated unspecialized cells into sick or
injured human tissue holds out the hope of miracle medical
cures. Some researchers harvest stem cells by destroying human
embryos, and these scientists now want access to federal funds
to support their work. By reviewing the history of stem cell re-
search, analyzing the state of applicable medical research law,
and applying scientific and philosophical considerations to the
debate, this Note will demonstrate that federally funded human
embryonic stem cell research is illegal, immoral, and unneces-
sary.
I. STEM CELL RESEARCH 101
In 1998, two research teams figured out how to isolate and
culture stem cells from human embryos. John Gearhart, a pro-
fessor of obstetrics/gynecology and physiology at Johns Hop-
tJ.D. Candidate at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
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kins University led one team1, which obtained its stem cells
from the gonad tissue of aborted fetuses. 2 James A. Thomson, a
University of Wisconsin-Madison developmental biologist, led
the other team 3, which extracted stem cells from excess em-
bryos created by In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) clinics.4 This team
published its results first,5 and ignited a firestorm of contro-
versy.
The rest of the scientific community soon realized the im-
plications of the researchers' discovery. Medical authorities
foresaw possible breakthrough treatments for previously un-
treatable diseases, given enough time, funding, and embryonic
stem cells suitable for implantation. Pro-life advocates immedi-
ately objected to the research because it destroyed human em-
bryos. Sympathetic pro-lifers in Congress moved to restrict hu-
man embryonic stem cell research (ESCR), setting off a legal
battle of national proportions.
To properly tackle the legal issues surrounding the ESCR
debate, one must have a basic working knowledge of human
embryology and cell development.
Totipotent stem cells, present only in the first four days af-
ter conception, have the ability to differentiate into all 210 types
of human tissue. 6 A totipotent cell (e.g., a human zygote) has
the inherent potential to develop into an individual adult organ-
ism. As its name suggests, its potential is total.7
Approximately four days after conception, the rapidly di-
viding and multiplying totipotent cells begin specializing.8 They
become pluripotent, that is capable of developing into many
(but not all) kinds of tissue. At this point the preborn human is
1 Press Release, Johns Hopkins Med. Inst., Hopkins Research Team Cultures
Long-Awaited Human Embryonic Stem Cells (Nov. 5, 1998), http://hopkins.med.jhu.
edu/press/1998/NOVEMBER/981105A.HTM.
2 NAT'S INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., STEM
CEu~s: A PRIMER, http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/primer.htm (May 2000) [here-
inafter NIH PRIMER].
3 Terry Devitt, Wisconsin Scientists Culture Elusive Embryonic Stem Cells,
WiS. WEEK, Nov. 5, 1998, http://www.news.wisc.edu/wisweek/view.msql?id=3327.
4 NIH PRIMER, supra note 2.
5 James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human
Blastocysts, 282 ScI. 1145 (1998).
6 See NIH PRIMER, supra note 2.7 id.
Sd.
91d.
508 [Vol. 12:507
ARE WE KILLING THE WEAK TO HEAL THE SICK?
known as a blastocyst, an eight- or sixteen-celled embryo that
has not yet successfully implanted in the mother's uterus. 10 In
state case law, blastocysts that have not yet implanted them-
selves in the uterus are often labeled with the medically impre-
cise legal term "pre-embryo." 1 Blastocyst implantation occurs
on about the fifth day after conception.
Shortly after this point, embryos have three layers of tissue:
the ectoderm (leading to production of hair and nerve tissue),
endoderm (producing lungs, liver and gut endothelium) and
mesoderm (producing blood, bone and striated muscle).' Fur-
ther along in the developmental process, pluripotent cells be-
come multipotent, giving rise to cells within just one narrow
category (e.g., certain multipotent stem cells become white
blood cells, red blood cells, and platelets). 13
Until the stem cell researchers' breakthrough, it was widely
accepted that after cells from one of the three embryonic layers
matured into adult tissue, those cells could not be transformed
into a type originating in one of the other two embryonic cell
layers. For example, cells of ectodermic origin could not be
changed into cells identical to those of endodermic or meso-
dermic origin. The researchers from Johns Hopkins and Wis-
consin shattered that assumption.
Unfortunately for researchers, Congress found out that the
two teams were forced to destroy each embryo from which they
extracted their stem cells. A peer-reviewed article published
almost simultaneously with the researchers' press releases
stated, "creating [embryonic stem] cell lines requires research-
ers to destroy an embryo."' 14 Congress stepped in to prohibit
federal funding for this research, the Executive Branch ob-
jected, and the current controversy began.
10 See id.
11 Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 849 (Ct. App. 1993); A.Z. v.
B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051,1052 n.1 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 614 n.1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist,
38 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tenn. 2000).
12 Letter from Rev. Msgr. Dennis N. Schnurr, United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops, to NIH Office of Science Policy n.11 (Jan. 31, 2000), http://www.
nccbuscc.org/prolifelissues/bioethic/comments.htm.13 NIH PRIMER, supra note 2.
14 Sabine Steghaus-Kovac, Ethical Loophole Closing Up for Stem Cell Re-
searchers, 286 Sci. 31 (1999).
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II. THE ROAD TO THE STEM CELL DEBATE
Since the federal government first regulated medical re-
search on human subjects in 1975, human embryos from im-
plantation onward have been included under the federal defini-
tion of "fetus," and have been treated as "human subjects" de-
serving protection from harmful research. 15 The current Na-
tional Institutes of Health child research policy indicates accep-
tance of that definition when it states "the inclusion of children
as participants in research must be in compliance with all appli-
cable subparts of 45 CFR 46 as well as with other pertinent fed-
eral laws and regulations whether or not the research is other-
wise exempted from 45 CFR 46. ' 16
Experiments on human embryos outside the womb (e.g.,
produced by IVF or cloning) have never received federal sup-
port. The federal regulations of 1975 prevented federally funded
IVF experiments unless an Ethics Advisory Board agreed upon
them. Bad press in the late 1970s persuaded the Carter Admini-
stration to dismantle the Board and to withdraw all federal
funds.
Within days of his first inauguration in 1993, President
Clinton changed everything when he sent a memorandum to his
Secretary of Health and Human Services. In it, he directed that
the nearly twenty-year-old regulatory ban on federal funding of
fetal tissue research be lifted.
7
15 See 42 USC § 289g(b) (1994) (setting forth the rules governing the use of
fetal research).
16 NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NIH
POLICY AND GUIDELINES ON THE INCLUSIONS OF CHILDREN AS PARTICIPANTS IN RE-
SEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS § I (March 1998), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/
guide/notice-files/not98-024.html.
17 Memorandum from President William J. Clinton, to Secretary of Health
and Human Services (Jan 22, 1993), http:llwww.grants.nih.gov/grants/guidenotice-
files/not93-091.html.
On March 22, 1988, the Assistant Secretary for Health of Health and Hu-
man Services ("HHS") imposed a temporary moratorium on Federal fund-
ing of research involving transplantation of fetal tissue from induced abor-
tions. Contrary to the recommendations of a National Institutes of Health
advisory panel, on November 2, 1989, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services extended the moratorium indefinitely. This moratorium has sig-
nificantly hampered the development of possible treatments for individuals
afflicted with serious diseases and disorders, such as Parkinson's disease,
Alzheimer's disease, diabetes, and leukemia. Accordingly, I hereby direct
that you immediately lift the moratorium.
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At the same time, Congress was changing the rules in a
similar way.18 However, even after it released federal funding in
1993 for fetal tissue research on aborted children, Congress
made certain that no federal funds would be directly involved in
the abortions themselves. Under the relaxed laws, fetal tissue,
defined as "tissue or cells obtained from a dead human embryo
or fetus after a spontaneous or induced abortion, or after a still-birth,' 19 could be used for "therapeutic purposes, '20 but only if
the researcher did not participate in the abortion and did not in-
fluence the "timing, method, or procedures used to terminate the
pregnancy."
21
In 1994, after a newly "Republicanized" Congress elimi-
nated the regulation demanding prior Ethics Advisory Board
approval, a Clinton administration Human Embryo Research
Panel recommended that the NIH fund some types of destruc-
tive embryo research, but the President rejected some of the
recommendations, and the newly conservative Congress re-
jected them all.
One of the more noteworthy of these never-implemented
recommendations from the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission would have required researchers to make clear
"that the research will involve the destruction of the
embryos. ' 22 The NIH eventually refused to follow the NBAC
suggestion, probably because using that language would have
closed the loophole that the NIH eventually used to sidestep the
law.The situation remained in an uneasy balance until Novem-
ber 1998, when the Thomson and Gearhart teams made their
breakthroughs in isolating and propagating embryonic stem
cells. In response to the revelation that this research required
the destruction of human embryos, and knowing that its restric-
tions on federally funded research on aborted fetal tissue might
be misunderstood or misapplied in ways it never intended, Con-
gress moved swiftly to curtail federal funding for this research
as well.
18 Note that the Republican landslide victory in the 1994 mid-term elec-
tion had not yet happened.
19 42 U.S.C § 289g-l(g).20 Id. § 289g-l(a)(1).
21 Id. § 289g-1(c)(4).
22 REPORT OF THE HuMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, NAT'L INSTS. OF
HEALTH 19 (Sept. 1994), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/stemcell.
pdf.
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The text of Congress's current ban on federally funded hu-
man ESCR lies in a 2000 amendment to the Departments of La-
bor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, an act which President
Clinton signed. The pertinent part of the amendment reads:
None of the funds made available in this Act may be
used for-
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for re-
search purposes; or
(2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are
destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of
injury or death greater than that allowed for research on
fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 46.208(a)(2) and section
498(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
289g(b)). 23
One could expect the House to reintroduce an identical ver-
sion of the amendment, with text unchanged from previous
years, once the time comes to consider the annual Labor, Health
and Human Services Appropriations Act.
The current embryonic research ban extends to embryos the
protection given to fetuses in the United States Code and in the
Code of Federal Regulations. The fetal research statute forbids
research or experimentation on fetuses unless the activity en-
hances the well-being or meets the health needs of the fetus, or
enhances the probability of its survival to viability; or will pose
.... 24
no added risk of suffering, injury, or death to the fetus. Also,the purpose of the research or experimentation must involve de-
23 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 5 10(a).
For purposes of this section, the term 'human embryo or embryos' includes
any organism, not protected as a human subject under 45 CFR 46 as of the
date of the enactment of this Act, that is derived by fertilization, partheno-
genesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes or
human diploid cells.
Id. § 510(b). The original ban was passed in the Balanced Budget Downpayment Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 26 (1996). The proposed continuation of this ban uses
precisely the same wording and is found in the Labor, Health & Human Services
Appropriations Act, H.R. 5656, 106th Cong. § 510(a) (2000).
24 42 U.S.C. § 289g(a).
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velopment of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be
obtained by other means.2
5
This same statute goes on to mandate that fetuses be treated
alike whether their mothers intend to abort them or not, and sets
the risk standard for fetal research at the same level as in the
human subject research rules, published in the Code of Federal
Regulations.26 Those regulations mirror the wording of the stat-
ute by requiring researchers to seek to meet the health needs of
the fetus while minimizing risk, and always ensuring that the
experiments pursue important biomedical knowledge that can-
not be obtained by other means.
27
I. THE NIH DEFIES CONGRESS
President Clinton signed the Labor, Health & Human Ser-
vices Appropriations Act of 1999, agreeing to hold the Execu-
tive Branch accountable to the terms of the amendment banning
federally funded destructive research on human embryos. But
long before the President agreed to continue protecting em-
bryos, Executive Branch officials were looking for ways around
the law.
25 Id. The full statute reads:
"The Secretary [of HHS] may not conduct or support any research or ex-
perimentation, in the United States or in any other country, on a nonviable
living human fetus ex utero or a living human fetus ex utero for whom vi-
ability has not been ascertained unless the research or experimentation-
(1) may enhance the well-being or meet the health needs of the fetus or en-
hance the probability of its survival to viability; or
(2) will pose no added risk of suffering, injury, or death to the fetus and the
purpose of the research or experimentation is the development of important
biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.
Id. (emphasis added).
2645 CFR § 46.208 (1999).
27 The full research restrictions read:
(a) No fetus in utero may be involved as a subject in any activity covered
by this subpart unless: (1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the health
needs of the particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the
minimum extent necessary to meet such needs, or (2) the risk to the fetus
imposed by the research is minimal and the purpose of the activity is the
development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be ob-
tained by other means.
(b) An activity permitted under paragraph (a) of this section may be con-
ducted only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given
their informed consent, except that the father's consent need not be secured
if: (1) His identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he
is not reasonably available, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from rape."
Id. (second and third emphasis added).
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On January 15, 1999, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), intent on pursuing ESCR despite the clearly-
worded congressional ban, issued a General Counsel's interpre-
tation of the ban and its effects. The General Counsel argued
that because pluripotent stem cells obtained from destroyed em-
bryos were not morally equivalent to embryos themselves (in
other words, the cells were not totipotent), ESCR was exempt
from the federal funding ban. On January 26, in a statement ex-
plaining the DHHS General Counsel's interpretation before a
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, National Institutes of
Health (NIH) Director Harold Varmus laid out an incredible
argument:
DHHS funds can be used to support.., research utiliz-
ing human pluripotent stem cells because human pluri-
potent stem cells are not embryos. The statute that bans
the use of Federal funds for embryo research . . . does
not... define [the term] organism.... By [our] defini-
tion . . . pluripotent stem cells are not and cannot de-
velop into organisms. Therefore, human pluripotent
stem cells are not embryos and are not covered by this
prohibition on Federal funding.
28
Three days after the President signed the ban into law, the
NIH did an about-face and issued proposed guidelines for sup-
porting ESCR with federal funds. 2The NIH attached one con-
dition: researchers could not use federal funds in the act of de-
struction itself.30 The final guidelines made no significant
changes.3'
As of this writing, the NIH's reasoning has not been for-
mally challenged in the House or Senate, but Congress is likely
to join the battle quickly if pro-life legislators come to believe
28 Statement of Harold Varmus, NIH Director, before the Senate Appropria-
tions Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies (Jan. 26, 1999), available at http:llwww.nih.govlnewslstemcelllstatement.
htm.
29 Press Release, National Institutes of Health, Approval Process for the Use
of Human Pluripotent Stem Cells in NIH-Supported Research (Aug. 23, 2000),
http:llgrants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-00-050.html.
30 See id. (linking to guidelines).
31 See National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human
Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 65,166 (Aug. 25, 2000), corrected by 65 Fed.
Reg. 69,951 (Nov. 21, 2000), available at http:llwww.nih.gov/news/stemcelllstem-
cellguidelines.htm.
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the NIH "loophole" poses a credible problem. But by any rea-
sonable interpretation, Congress did not limit the scope of its
funding ban to the extent claimed by the NIH. It is no great
stretch to read the plain meaning of the statute and discern that
Congress intended to ban not just the destruction of the embryo,
but research that requires or relies upon the deliberate destruc-
tion of embryos.
By commonly accepted rules of statutory construction, the
NIH's reasoning fails to pass muster. First, a statute must be
construed to avoid rendering any of its words superfluous, if
possible 32 The NIH's interpretation of the ban falls short by ig-
noring the words "research in which a human embryo or em-
bryos are destroyed. 33 Second, when Congress chooses differ-
ent language in nearby sections of the same statute-one nar-
row, one broad-it is presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and the statute must be construed to give effect to those differ-
ences. 34 The NIH interpretation ignores the difference between
§ 510(a)(1) and §510(a)(2) in the statute, and ignores the
broader scope of the latter.
Absent any language suggesting that Congress intended to
distinguish between embryos based on where they happen to be,
common sense suggests Congress intended to treat human em-
bryos outside the womb with the same respect already accorded
to embryos and fetuses inside the womb. Remember too, that
the NIH's own Human Embryo Research Panel35 and President
Clinton's own National Bioethics Advisory Commission 36 con-
ceded that frozen embryos deserve respect as a form of human
life.
Interestingly, Director Varmus's testimony also neglected to
explain to the Senate just how drastically and quickly the NIH's
understanding of the law had changed. Just two years earlier the
NIH considered the same facts and came to the opposite conclu-
sion. In 1997, an NIH researcher used NIH funds and equipment
to study "preimplantation genetics involving molecular or cyto-
32 Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters, 519 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1997); United States
v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528,538-39 (1955).
33 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §
510(a)(2).
34 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
35 NIH, Human Embryo Research Panel, at 2.
36 Letter of Dr. Harold Shapiro, Chairman of National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, to President Clinton (Sep. 7, 1999).
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genetic analysis from DNA derived from a human embryo or a
single cell from a human blastomere from a cleavage stage em-
bryo." 37 This researcher's embryonic cells came from a non-
NIH funded source, 38 but the NIH quickly terminated his grant
anyway, fired him, apologized profusely to Congress for violat-
ing the ban, and promised not to do it again. But in two short
years, what NIH once saw as a violation of the law transformed
into a justification for ignoring that now-inconvenient and un-
profitable law.
To add further perspective, examine the NIH's own policy
concerning research on children and consider how it would pro-
hibit ESCR if embryos were counted as children. The guidelines
mirror the contents of 45 CFR § 46.401-409:
Generally, healthy children can be studied when the re-
search is considered as "not greater than minimal risk."
Children can be involved in research with greater than
minimal risk only when it presents the prospect of direct
benefit to the individual child or is likely to yield gener-
alizable knowledge about the child's disorder or condi-
tion. DHHS can support other research involving chil-
dren only with the approval of the Office for Prevention
from Research Risks after consultation with an appro-
priate panel of experts.39
Clearly, ESCR would be prohibited if embryos were consid-
ered children. The United States Catholic Conference assessed
the situation correctly when it said, "[i]n short, the [NIH] guide-
lines permit precisely what Congress and the President forbade
with passage and signing of the Appropriations Act: the use of
federal taxpayer dollars for research that involves the killing of
human embryos."
40
37 Continued Management Concerns at the NIH: Hearing before the Sub-
comm, on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 34
(1997) (letter from Kate A. Berg, PhD, Deputy Scientific Director, NCHGR).
38 See id.
39 OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL RES., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE NIH POLICY AND GUIDELINES ON THE INCLU-
SION OF CHILDREN AS PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS § 21
(March 1999), http:llgrants.nih.gov/grants/fundinglchildrenlpol-childrenqa.htm
(citations omitted).40 Letter from Rev. Msgr. Dennis N. Schnurr, supra note 12, § II.
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Congress's official opposition to ESCR faced three internal
challenges in the last year of its 106th session, but all three
failed to overturn the ban contained in the appropriations
amendment. The Medicare Patient Access to Technology Act of
1999 41 was referred to a Senate committee on September 23,
1999, where it died. House Resolution 414, which would have
accomplished the same goal, died in a House subcommittee on
February 4, 2000.42 Most recently, the Stem Cell Research Act
of 2000 (S. 2015) died in a Senate committee hearing on Sep-
tember 20, 2000. 43
On the presidential campaign trail, candidate George W.
Bush objected to ESCR. His spokesman told the media 'Gover-
nor Bush opposes federal funding for stem-cell research when it
involves destroying a living, human embryo.' 44 It seemed rea-
sonable to predict that the NIH's policy would undergo a drastic
shift under President Bush.
Shortly after taking office, President Bush predictably di-
rected his new HHS Secretary, Tommy Thompson, to review
NIH policy on ESCR and report back with any information
relevant to Bush's assessment of his administration's policy on
federal funding.4
5
On March 8, 2001 several pro-life individuals and groups
filed suit in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia
to compel DHHS and NIH to enforce the statutory ban on fed-
eral funding of ESCR.46 The following month, shortly before an
NIH fund allocation meeting scheduled for April 25, HHS Sec-
retary Thompson ordered NIH to halt progress on federal fund-
ing until further notice.47
On August 9, 2001 after months of public inquiry, President
Bush delivered a speech announcing his administration's stance
41 S. 1626, 106th Cong. (1999).
42 H.R. Res. 414, 106th Cong. (2000).
43 THOMAs: LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, LIBRARY OF CONG.,
BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 106th Cong., S.2015, at http:llthomas.loc.gov/cgi-binl
bdquery/D?d106:25:.Jtemp/-bdoDKd:@ @ @L&summ2=m&Vbss/dlO6query.htmll.
44 Mary Leonard, Abortion Foes See Politics in Stem-Cell Study Policy, BOS-
TON GLOBE, Aug. 24,2000, at Al.
45 See Rick Weiss, Bush Administration Order Halts Stem Cell Meeting; NIH
Planned Session to Review Fund Requests, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2001, at A2.
46 Nightlight Christian v. Thompson, No. 01-502 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 8,
2001). As of August 31, 2001, the case has been temporarily stayed at the plaintiffs'
request.47 Weiss, supra note 45.
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on stem cell research. He decided to restrict federal funding
for ESCR to the roughly sixty existing stem cell lines "where
the life and death decision has already been made."49 He also
approved federal funding for research on non-embryonic stem
cells, and signaled the formation of a President's council to
monitor stem cell research.
50
The 107th Congress picked up where the 106th left off, and
opponents of the ban have not given up. A House resolution ex-
pressing support for human ESCR was referred to the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce on January 30 of this
year.5 1 More importantly, the text of the continued congres-
sional ban will soon be up for annual consideration in the De-
partments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Expect a major fight
in the sharply divided House when this Act reaches the floor,
and watch for the Democrat-controlled Senate to remove the
ban from its version of the appropriations bill.
In response to rumors of congressional efforts to erase the
ban entirely, President Bush warned on August 13, 2001 he
would veto any attempt by Congress to expand federally funded
embryonic stem-cell research beyond his plan.
52
As of this writing, the congressional ban on federal funding
for human ESCR remains in effect. As such, an honest assess-
ment of the situation demonstrates that federal funding for such
research is still illegal, notwithstanding the convoluted reason-
ing of the Clinton-era NIH and its researchers.
IV. THE COURTS TEST THE WATERS
With the Executive and Legislative branches locked in po-
litical combat over human ESCR, the odds of federal court in-
volvement grow larger every day. Current constitutional law
lends little help to those who oppose this research, partly be-
cause the issue is so novel that prior cases fail to address the
issue. Worse still for the pro-life cause, the linchpin concept of
48 Press Release, President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on
Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), at http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/08/20010809-2.html [hereinafter Bush Press Release].
49 Id.
50 See id.
51 H.R. Con. Res. 17, 107th Cong. (2001).
52 Frank Bruni, Bush Says He Will Veto Any Bill Broadening His Stem Cell
Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14,2001, at Al.
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abortion case law ("the preborn are not people") will almost
surely carry over into the coming stem cell cases.
Abortion disputes had a checkered history in American
courts in the last third of the twentieth century, and stem cell
researchers will probably rely heavily on abortion case law to
bolster their position. However, a close reading of the U.S. Su-
preme Court's abortion decisions strongly suggests that the re-
searchers will not be able to travel the path of Fourteenth
Amendment "privacy rights" in their quest for legal legitimacy.
Pregnant women have been able to claim a nearly inviola-
ble right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment because
of a line of U.S. Supreme Court cases dating back to 1965. The
history of the Court's abortion jurisprudence has been picked
apart in detail by hundreds of commentators and scholars who
point out that the most influential "reproductive rights" cases
offer glaring examples of fallacious logic, misstatements of fact,
and political agendas legislated from the bench.53 But rather
than detour through a similar critique of each case, this Note
will summarize the progression of the Court's reasoning, and
then explain why its reasoning does not apply to ESCR on any
subject other than legal personhood.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court ruled a Connecticut
law prohibiting contraceptive use unconstitutional because it
violated the 14th Amendment's implied "right to privacy" en-
joyed by married couples in the home.54 Eisenstadt v. Bairdi5
extended Griswold's reasoning and held that a Massachusetts
law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives and contraceptive
information was an unconstitutional invasion of the privacy of
unmarried people, and unfairly treated them differently from
married people.
53 Consider the responses of the dissents in cases such as Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that one day Stenberg "will
be assigned its rightful place in history of this Court's jurisprudence beside Kore-
matsu and Dred Scott"), Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979, 944
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that the question of abortion,
and limitations upon it, should be decided "by citizens trying to persuade one another
and then voting") (Rehnquist, C.J. concurring and dissenting) (noting "the confused
state of this Court's abortion jurisprudence"), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222
(1973) (White, J., dissenting) (stating the Court has "scarcely any reason or authority
for its actions").
-' 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
55405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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The watershed abortion case of Roe v. Wade56 expanded
Eisenstadt's "right to privacy" to include the "right to abor-
tion," which explicitly outlawed Texas's abortion statute and
implied similar laws in other states were invalid. Roe estab-
lished the now-outmoded trimester framework that increased
the degree of interest in a pregnancy that States may lawfully
exercise as the preborn child develops. 57 In Doe v. Bolton,58 a
case handed down on the same day as Roe, the Court expanded
the right to abortion by striking down a Georgia statute prohibit-
ing abortion unless the mother's life was in danger, the preborn
child was severely deformed, or the preborn child was the prod-
uct of rape. In striking down Georgia's abortion statute, the Doe
court required that abortion statutes add the "health of the
mother" exception to survive constitutional scrutiny, and ex-
plained that the relevant factors to be considered in determining
health risk involved physical, emotional, Vsychological, and
familial factors, as well as the woman's age.
Nineteen years later, Planned Parenthood v. Casey did
away with Roe's trimesters and concentrated on viability as the
key issue, with the majority opinion stating, "[w]e reject the
trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the
essential holding of Roe.'60 Casey struck down most of a com-
plex Pennsylvania abortion statute, and created an "undue bur-
den" test for balancing a State's interest in protecting the pre-
born against a mother's wish to abort her child. Under this test,
any state regulation that "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus" is an unconstitutional "undue burden" on a
woman's right to seek an abortion.
61
Most recently, Stenberg v. Carhart62 held that a Nebraska
law criminalizing partial-birth abortions (also known as "intact
dilation & extraction," or D&X) was unconstitutional because it
lacked a Doe-style "health of the mother" exception, and placed
an "undue burden" on a woman's right to an abortion. The Ne-
braska statute imposed this undue burden by being susceptible
56 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57 Id. at 164-65.
58 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
59 Id. at 192.
60 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992).
61 Id. at 877.
62 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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to an interpretation that would outlaw "dilation & evacuation"
(D&E) abortions and not just D&X abortions.63
What do these abortion cases tell us about ESCR? They do
not say much at first glance, because the phrase "stem cell re-
search" does not appear-in all but Stenberg, the coming break-
through was years away. But although no case law yet addresses
human ESCR specifically, it is no great stretch to make two
predictions: someone will eventually end up in court fighting
over the issue, and the unlucky judge who gets the case will be
torn between muddled case law, vocal politicians, and ever-
present media pundits, all of whom will second-guess any deci-
sion the judge makes.
One obvious conclusion comes immediately to mind. No-
body's womb is involved in legal disputes over embryos sitting
in a tank of liquid nitrogen and destined for dissection in a petri
dish, so the Fourteenth Amendment right of privacy from the
Griswold-Roe-Stenberg line of cases does not apply to human
ESCR. At least one State has acknowledged this explicitly. In a
custody battle over frozen embryos the New York Court of Ap-
peals held the disposition of frozen embryos before implanta-
tion does not implicate a woman's right of privacy or bodily
integrity in the area of reproductive choice.
64
With the right of privacy ruled out as a basis for supporting
ESCR, the American legal system's confused view of person-
hood now needs detailed examination.
V. TO BE OR NOT TO BE... A PERSON
Put simply, federal courts hold logically inconsistent posi-
tions on the proper application of legal personhood, but never-
theless they remain ideologically consistent in denying person-
hood status to the preborn.
The Roe Court surveyed the forty-nine appearances of the
word "person" in the text of the Constitution, concluded that the
word almost always refers to born human beings, and decided
that none of the ambiguous uses of "person!' convincingly apply
to the preborn. 65 The Court finished its personhood analysis by
declaring: "All this, together with our observation that through-
out the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abor-
63 Id.
64 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998).65 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 157-59 (1973).
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tion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us
that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not include the unborn." 66
Lower federal courts are usually quick to follow the Su-
preme Court's lead on abortion-related disputes. In a
representative case, Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co.,67 a court
in Virginia decided embryos are not entitled to the protections
granted to people, and therefore cannot suffer an actionable tort.
Yet things are rarely so clear-cut in matters of law. To fur-
ther complicate matters, non-human entities like corporations,
ships, or seized property can be considered people under federal
law. Why? In the strictest sense, "person" is a legal term of art
that grants standing to sue and protect one's interests.
For example, under admiralty law, a salvage action may be
brought in the name of the rescuing vessel.68 In 1902, JusticeBrown of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote almost poetically:
A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long
as her identity is preserved. Prior to her launching she is
a mere congeries of wood and iron .... In the baptism
of launching she receives her name, and from the mo-
ment her keel touches the water she is transformed ....
She acquires a personality of her own .... 69
Other cases establish a foundational rule in collision litigation
where the first-libeled ship may counterclaim in its own name. 7
To fully grasp the federal bench's rulings even more
clearly, consider Justice William 0. Douglas's opinions on legal
personhood. He agreed with the common law notion that inani-
mate things can be people under the law, but when confronted
with fetal personhood, Douglas balked. His personhood argu-
ments in a dissenting opinion from a 1972 case do not comport
with the opinion he supported in Roe the following year, offer-
ing another example of logical inconsistency (although ideo-
66 Id. at 158 (citation omitted); See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (indicating one's own right to define the concept of existence).
67 7 F.Supp.2d 737, 742 (E.D. Va. 1998).
68 The Camanche, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 448 (1869).
69 Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424,438 (1902).
70 See The Gylfe v. The Trujillo, 209 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1954) (finding dam-
ages for loss of profit while vessel is laid up should be measured with reference to
probable profits on charter).
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logically, Douglas was consistent). In Sierra Club v. Morton,
Douglas wrote:
Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's
ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of
standing upon environmental objects to sue for their
own preservation....
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litiga-
tion. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found use-
ful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole- a
creature of ecclesiastical law-is an acceptable adver-
sary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary
corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudica-
tory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiri-
tual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine mead-
ows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of
trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive
pressures of modem technology and modem life.7'
One year after Sierra Club, Justice Douglas contradicted
himself. In contrast to his granting of personhood to inanimate
objects and non-material organizations, Justice Douglas refused
to acknowledge prebom humans as people under the law by
joining Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe. Compare
Justice Douglas's statements in Roe with his dissent in Sierra
Club:
The Constitution does not define "person" in so
many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
contains three references to "person." The first, in de-
fining "citizens," speaks of "persons born or natural-
ized in the United States." The word also appears both
in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection
Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Constitu-
tion: in the listing of qualifications for Representatives
and Senators, in the Apportionment Clause, in the Mi-
gration and Importation provision, in the Emolument
71 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-43 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
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Clause, in the Electors provisions, in the provision out-
lining qualifications for the office of President, in the
Extradition provisions, and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and
Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in §§ 2 and 3
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these
instances, the use of the word is such that it has
application only postnatally. None indicates, with any
assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application.72
Douglas did not offer any defense of his inconsistent stance
on personhood. Until his death, he maintained his belief that
corporations, ships, rivers, beaches, and even air should be con-
sidered people in a court of law, but denied the same status to
children in the womb. His logical inconsistency effectively ex-
emplifies the puzzling and discouraging state of federal person-
hood case law.
VI. REGULATORY ODDS AND ENDS
Leaving the federal courts behind, we now turn to other ju-
risdictions in search of applicable precedent. Some state courts
readily tow the federal "party line" on personhood. For exam-
ple, in Kass v. Kass,73 a 1998 case litigated before the New
York Court of Appeals, a divorced couple argued over the dis-
position of five frozen, stored pre-embryos they had conceived
while married five years before. They had hoped to use IVF to
assist them in having a child. The woman wanted to impregnate
herself with the embryos since it was her "only chance for ge-
netic motherhood." 74 The man did not want to be a father, and
demanded enforcement of a prior written agreement between
the two, which provided for donation of any unused embryos
for medical research if the couple divorced. The court upheld
the agreement, explicitly denying that the pre-embryos were
people, defining them as something akin to property, and ruling
that "agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, re-
garding disposition of their pre-[embryos] should generally be
presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute be-
tween them."
75
72 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 157 (1973) (citations omitted).
7' 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
74Id. at 175.
75 Id. at 174 (syllabus).
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However, despite twenty-eight years of abortion-friendly
pronouncements from the U.S. Supreme Court, state courts still
issue confusing rulings from time to time, especially when they
confront the personhood of the prebor head-on.
In the embryo custody battle of Davis v. Davis, the Tennes-
see Supreme Court ruled that pre-embryos are neither people
nor property, but occupy "an interim category that entitles them
to special respect because of their potential for human life.",
76
The court refused to choose, and created an unheard-of hybrid
category of being. This refusal to decide between two mutually
exclusive options confounds scholars to this day. The U.S. Su-
preme Court refused to hear any appeal, which keeps the con-
fused reasoning of this case alive and well.
In a recent Washington case, Litowitz v. Litowitz,77 a mar-
ried couple separated and began a custody battle over two cryo-
preserved embryos, left over from their previous attempts to
have a child after the woman had a hysterectomy. The sperm
came from the man, but a third party donated the eggs. The
woman wanted the pre-embryos awarded to her for implanting
in a surrogate, after which she would raise any resulting chil-
dren. The man wanted to donate the pre-embryos to an out-of-
state couple. In contrast to Davis and Kass, this court went to
great lengths to avoid the personhood issue. The man prevailed
because the court ruled he was not bound to become a parent by
a pre-existing contract (between the separated couple and the
egg-donating couple), and because he was the only progenitor
before the court. Confronted with a black-and-white dilemma,
the Washington state courts have opted instead for Tennessee's
land of gray.
In addition, there is at least one state that carries a puzzling
law on its books. In California, fetuses can be murder victims.
At first glance, California statute seems to grant personhood to
the preborn, but in effect it leans the other way. Specifically, the
California murder statute reads: "Murder is the unlawful killing
of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought," 79 and
then goes on to explicitly exempt abortion from the definition of
76 842 S.W.2d 588,597 (Tenn. 1992).
77 Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g granted,
21 P.3d 292 (2001).7s Id. at 1088.
7 9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2000).
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"murder. ' 8° Pro-life advocates sometimes argue that this law
shows the California legislature confers personhood status on
preborn children who happen to be wanted by their mothers, but
that view is not really accurate. Generally accepted principles of
statutory construction presume legislatures avoid redundancy
when drafting laws, so it stands to reason that the California
Assembly was probably drawing a distinction between "human
being" and "fetus" by including both terms in the murder stat-
ute. Further, the California manslaughter statute makes no ref-
erence to fetuses, even though the murder statute does. 81 Cali-
fornia courts have construed the murder statute as refusing to
include fetuses under the definition of 'human being.'
82
Setting the technicalities of statutory construction aside,
and extending all due respect to the California legislature and
courts, the logic of the murder statute is still questionable. It
appears morally unintelligible to define the unlawful killing of a
non-human being as full-blown murder. The label of "murder"
has traditionally been reserved for the unjustified killing of hu-
man beings-of people. The legislature's attempt to paper over
the ideological gap between condemning murder and permitting
elective abortion falls short when it tries to categorize the
unlawful killing of an preborn human being.
California's murder statute reasoning can be logically ex-
tended to protect other non-human entities. Why stop with pro-
tecting just one class of non-human beings? Some animal rights
activists view fish, snakes and flies as morally equivalent to
humans. Why not protect dear family pets, which often receive
more love than unwanted children? If we stretch the non-human
murder victim definition a bit further, could a California sport
fisherman be committing murder by catching a rainbow trout?
Pro-life advocate Greg Koukl quite rightly illustrates another
irrationality in the California murder statute when he asks,
"[h]ow does the blameworthy taking of an innocent human life
become justifiable simply because Mom says it's okay and a
80 See id. § 187(b)(1) (exempting behavior that complies with the State's
Therapeutic Abortion Act); see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (2000) (declaring
that the willful killing of an unborn quick child, by an injury to the mother of such
child to be manslaughter).
81 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192.
82 E.g., People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 594 (Cal. 1994).
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doctor does it?"' 83 The California murder statute's distinction
between "human being" and "fetus" serves neither side of the
issue well, and it contributes little of value to the personhood
debate.
A search through other state statutes reveals that the NIH
may have difficulty finding a laboratory in which to conduct
destructive stem cell research on human embryos. Florida, Lou-
isiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Is-
land prohibit research on the preborn to one strict degree or an-
other, permitting only research that will directly benefit the pre-
born, and only if no other medical treatment will suffice.
84
Since States often protect preborn children much more robustly
than the federal government does, other state legislatures seek-
ing to prohibit ESCR will surely look to these statutes when
drafting their own versions, which will make stem cell research
even more difficult.
To round out the murky regulatory picture, a look at laws in
other countries shows that agreement on ESCR is still a long
way off. For example, the Australian Territory of Victoria regu-
lates IVF activities, limiting it to approved facilities, limiting
availability to married women, regulating confidentiality, pro-
viding for a Standing Review and Advisory Committee, and
banning commercial surrogacy. 85 South Australia established a
Council on Reproductive Technology, wrote a code of ethical
practice, established IVF licensing procedures, prohibited em-
bryo flushing, prohibited cryopreservation lasting longer than
ten years, and outlawed all research 'detrimental to an em-
bryo.'86 German law makes it a criminal offense to do any de-
structive embryo research 8 7
83 Gregory Koukl, Stand to Reason, The "Murder" of a Fetus, at
http:llwww.str.org/free/commentaries/abortion/themurde.htm (last updated Aug. 11,
1998).
84 See APPENDIX A: STATE STATUTES ON FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH for the full
text of these statutes. Note how easily the scope of the statutes (which address fetal
tissue research in general) can be expanded to cover embryos, simply by passing
legislation similar to the U.S. Congress's ban.
85 Ronald M. Green, Stopping Embryo Research, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 235, 239
n.13 (1999).
86 Id.
87 id.
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The Council of Europe banned the practice of creating em-
bryos for research purposes, but.only six countries ratified the
ban.8
8
In England, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
of 199089 established a national board that licenses research
proposals that include human embryos. The British Royal Soci-
ety recently gave its endorsement to ESCR, without objection
from the British government.
90
In France, the national government is drafting guidelines
permitting stem cell extraction from embryos between seven
and twelve days old, provided that the embryos are left over
from IVF procedures and are destined to be discarded. 91
In summary, state statutory and common law offers little
consensus on human ESCR, and international law exhibits simi-
lar disunity.
VII. EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH IS
MORALLY WRONG
In the summer of 2001, the moral implications of ESCR
came to the forefront of America's consciousness as President
George W. Bush wrestled with the claims advanced by both
sides of the debate. After months of consultation, study, and
reflection, the President outlined his intention to permit feder-
ally funded ESCR only on those lines of human embryonic stem
cells in existence on or before the date of his speech. President
Bush's statements illustrate the competing arguments he strug-
gled to reconcile:
88 The Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
effective December 1, 1999, leaves to each country the decision to allow or forbid
embryo research, but it nevertheless requires that countries prohibit "the creation of
human embryos for research purposes." Council of Europe, Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being With Regard to the Appli-
cation of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
ch.V, Art. 18, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ENTreaties/Html/164.
htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2001). The Convention has been ratified by Denmark,
Greece, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
89 Green, supra note 35, at 239 n.13.
90 See ROYAL Soc'Y, STEM CELL RESEARCH & THERAPEUTIC CLONING at
http:llwww.royalsoc.ac.uk/policy/stemcells.htm (Nov. 2000).
91 Agence France Presse, French Premier Backs Embryo Research, Remains
Opposed to Cloning (November 28, 2000).92 Bush Press Release, supra note 48.
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On the first issue, are these embryos human life-
well, one researcher told me he believes this five-day-
old cluster of cells is not an embryo, not yet an individ-
ual, but a pre-embryo. He argued that it has the poten-
tial for life, but it is not a life because it cannot develop
on its own.
An ethicist dismissed that as a callous attempt at
rationalization. Make no mistake, he told me, that clus-
ter of cells is the same way you and I, and all the rest of
us, started our lives.. One goes with a heavy heart if we
use these, he said, because we are dealing with the
seeds of the next generation.
93
However well-meaning, President Bush's decision to permit
limited funding still went too far by lending an air of legitimacy
to research founded upon the intentional killing of human be-
ings. Researchers eager to get funding realized their advantage
immediately. One of them reacted to the speech with frank
pragmatism, saying "[i]n the long run, this number of 60 will be
a forgotten relic of the political debate. The important thing is
not so much the number 60. It's really that the green light went
on for federal funding of this research.",94 This scientist under-
stood that President Bush made a critical exception to his pro-
life principles, exposing himself to Washington's ability to
stretch an exception far beyond its original scope.
Although President Bush made a mistake in his moral rea-
soning, his example need not be followed. As matters stand,
Congress still thinks ESCR is morally wrong, the President
agrees but wants to allow it for already dead embryos, NIH re-
searchers think it acceptable, the courts lie somewhere in be-
tween 95 (albeit much closer to the NIH's position than to Con-
93 Id.
94 Ceci Connolly et al. Viability of Stem Cell Plan Doubted: Bush Policy
Could Limit Research, Scientists Say, WASH. PosT, Aug. 20, 2001, at Al, available
at http:llwww.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33338-2001Augl9.htnil.
95 As we have already seen, the American legal system's persistent confusion
on the personhood of the preborn, despite nearly three decades of U.S. Supreme
Court pronouncements categorically refusing to recognize that status, suggests that
legal precedent alone will not end the debate. In Roe, Justice Blackmun clearly un-
derstood the implications of recognizing the personhood of the prebom. He wrote: "If
[the appellee's] suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of
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gress's), the fifty states have yet to reach consensus, laws from
overseas offer little guidance, and public opinion seems to wa-
ver96 depending on whose opinion polls and public pronounce-
ments one believes. Since the fight over statutory law continues,
and since case law offers few precedents that favor the reason-
ing behind the pro-life position, it would be wise to consider a
purely ethical solution to the problem.
If we pick apart the moral confusion surrounding ESCR, we
can discover why it is actually very wrong to support it with
federal funds. We can pierce the moral fog by appealing to es-
tablished laws of science, irrefutable principles of logic, and
honestly applied philosophy. We must answer just one question:
what is the preborn?
We can make a compelling argument that the preborn is a
human person, entitled to the same measure of respect and pro-
tection that we accord any newborn infant. Moving logically
from that point, if we know that intentionally killing an inno-
cent human being is a moral wrong, and if ESCR requires the
intentional killing of an innocent human being, we must then
conclude that such research is a serious moral wrong.
When we examine the only question that matters ("what is
the preborn?"), we find that the preborn are people for three rea-
sons. First, human parents only produce human offspring, which
means the preborn are members of the human community.
Second, the four differences, discussed in greater detail below,
between the preborn and the newborn are morally irrelevant.
Third, the preborn are human people because they have a human
nature, not because they perform certain functions.
We begin with the obvious truth that human parents produce
human offspring. The embryo is genetically unique, and pos-
course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by
the [14th] Amendment." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 156-57 (1973).
96 The same moral fog blinds us as well. For example, actor Michael J. Fox
authored a recent letter to the editor of the New York Times, focusing on points like
the following: "Stem cell work uses... embryos produced during in vitro fertiliza-
tion, a process that creates many more fertilized eggs than are implanted in the
wombs of women trying to become pregnant.... Most of these microscopic clumps
of cells are destined to be destroyed--ending any potential for life." Michael J. Fox,
A Crucial Election for Medical Research, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 2000, at A35. Fox
misunderstands the issue. If embryos are people, then destroying them through medi-
cal research in an effort to extract some benefit from their impending doom is no
more permissible than conducting harmful experiments on death row prisoners and
then excusing the crime by saying "well they're going to die anyway."
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sesses the inherent capacity to develop into an adult. It is human
from conception, although immature (just as a newborn baby is
immature). The preborn, therefore, is not a potential human but
a human with great potential.97 Living things do not change
from one kind of being into another over time. They only
change their form. What they are stays the same.9
8
The scientific Law of Biogenesis, established unequivocally
over a century ago by Louis Pasteur states that each living
thing reproduces after its own kind.99 Logically building our
reasoning on this objective truth, we must conclude that human
parents can only produce human offspring. To reject this scien-
tific law and deny the humanity of the preborn, a supporter of
ESCR must clear two hurdles. First, he must explain what the
preborn entity actually is if it is not human, and second, he must
explain how two human beings can violate the Law of Biogene-
sis by mating to create a being that begins as a non-human but
later becomes one. Until someone refutes the Law of Biogene-
sis, science forces us to admit that human embryos are human
beings.
Having scientifically established the humanity of embryos,
we next use logic to consider the philosophical differences be-
tween preborn human beings and those human beings we un-
equivocally consider "people." The preborn differs from the
newborn in four ways: size, level of development, environment,
and degree of dependency. One can use the acronym SLED to
easily remember these four categories. 100
We first think about size. Embryos are smaller than new-
borns, but we know size is not relevant for determining person-
hood. I am over six feet tall and weigh nearly two hundred
pounds, which makes me far larger than most of my female col-
leagues, but no one can credibly claim that I am therefore more
97 FRANcis J. BECKWITH, POLIICALLY CORRECT DEATH: ANSWERING ARGOu-
MENTS FOR ABORTION RiGHTs 94 (1993).98 GREGORY KOuKL, PREcious UNBORN HuMAN PERSONS 21 (1999).
99 Id. at 22; See also Biogenesis and Abiogenesis, New Advent (stating "all
visible organisms arise only from germs of the same kind"), at http://www.new ad-
vent.org/cathen/02571a.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
10o Scott Klusendorf, Fetal Tissue and Embryo Stem Cell Research: The
March of Dimes, NIH, and Alleged Moral Neutrality, at 32 (2000), at
http://www.str.org/free/bioethics/stemcell.pdf; STEPHEN D. SCHWARZ, THE MORAL
QUESTION OF ABORTION 15-18 (1990) (coining the acronym SLED which has been
popularized by Klusendorf).
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of a person than they are. We intuitively understand that size is
irrelevant when determining if a human is a person.
Next, we consider differences in level of development. A
newborn is less developed than a toddler, who is less developed
than an adolescent, who is less developed than an adult. All are
properly accorded equal status as people under the law, even
though they look different. Prepubescent children have not yet
developed sexually, but we consider them people. Retarded
children with severely underdeveloped brains also count as peo-
ple. So what should we logically conclude when we observe
that embryos are less developed than newborns? We realize that
we cannot define people based upon how developed they hap-
pen to be. We must define people based on what they are. A
person has the innate capacity to perform personal acts, even if
that person cannot do so at the moment. A human being's level
of development is irrelevant when assessing personhood.
What of differences in environment? The human embryo in-
side the mother is in a different environment than the newborn
baby, and the human embryo frozen in a bottle of liquid nitro-
gen is in a very different environment than either of the other
two human beings. Environment, however, has no relevance
when it comes to deciding which human beings are people. I did
not become less of a person by getting out of my car earlier to-
day, nor did I become more of a person by sitting down in front
of my computer. My status as a person does not change depend-
ing upon which side of my bed I choose to sleep on tonight.
Nor does it matter if I put on scuba gear and descend sixty feet
underwater. Clearly, where one is has no bearing on who one
is. 1° 1 Likewise, a newborn girl's short trip down the birth canal
cannot logically make her more of a person than her identical
twin about to follow her. By the same token a frozen human
embryo is no less entitled to our protection, even though it sits
suspended in a bottle rather than growing in a womb.
Last, we think about differences in degree of dependency,
which lawyers and politicians call "viability." Those who argue
that viability makes all the difference are wrong. Otherwise,
many born human beings would have to be considered "non-
people." For example, everyone dependent on pacemakers, di-
alysis machines, insulin, respirators, or wheelchairs would for-
feit their status as people. After all, each relies on external help
101 BECKWITH, supra note 97, at 114.
[Vol. 12:507
ARE WE KILLING THE WEAK TO HEAL THE SICK?
to survive and none are viable in the true sense of the word. In
fact, newborn children cannot honestly be considered viable ei-
ther, because without the care and feeding they receive from
their parents, they quickly die. If we refuse to strip diabetics
and newborns of their personhood on viability grounds, by what
logic can we do so to embryos? As one former abortionist
points out, there is no moral difference between a preborn child
'plugged into' and dependent upon a mother and a kidney pa-
tient plugged into and "dependent" upon a dialysis machine.102
Degree of dependency has no bearing on a human being's status
as a person.
We can see, then, that the preborn child differs from a new-
born child in only four ways: size, level of development,
environment, and degree of dependency. Individually, none of
these criteria have anything important to say about whether a
human being is a person, and no combination of these criteria
carries any additional moral weight.
The more philosophical opponents of the pro-life position
often object to such straightforward summaries of their views.
They argue that the preborn are not people because they cannot
function in the same ways that we do. They claim that a true
"person" meets certain criteria; he or she has feelings, self-
awareness, consciousness, the ability to feel pain, or the ability
to interact with his or her environment. Following this reason-
ing, since embryos and the rest of the preborn have few or none
of these capabilities, they cannot be people and need not be pro-
tected from destruction. Note that those who use this argument
take their criteria for personhood as givens, without any attempt
to explain why a person must possess these traits. 103 This belief
system is known as functionalism, a belief that suffers from
several flaws.
10 4
First, someone can fail to function as a person and yet still
be a person. Many unconscious humans cannot feel pain, and no
unconscious humans are self-aware nor can they reason, but we
still consider them people. Second, someone must be a person
in order to function as one. One grows in the ability to perform
102 BERNARD N. NATHANSON & RICHARD N. OSTLING, ABORTING AMERICA
213 (1979).
103 Neither do these theorists clearly explain how much moral weight each
criterion carries, nor which combinations of criteria tip the scales toward personhood.
104 For a discussion of functionalism and its counterarguments, see KOUKL,
PRECIous UNBORN HuMAN PERSONS, at 20-35.
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personal acts only because one already is the kind of being that
can do so (i.e., a person). °5 Third, one's right to live does not
depend on one's intelligence. If functionalism is correct, then
personhood could be expressed by an "intelligence curve" in
which human beings move toward full personhood in their early
years, reach it in middle age, then lose it with advancing age
and the accompanying loss of mental function. This makes no
sense. Fourth, functionalists cannot escape the problems posed
by personal identity. Paul Cox and Scott Rae point out the non-
sensical implications when they explain, "if I do not exist until
sometime after my birth, in what sense is the birth mine? The
only way for 'my birth' to be more than a linguistic convention
is to admit that 'I' existed before I was born, or at least at the
time of my birth."'
10 6
Applying logic and common sense, we can see that any em-
bryo commands the same moral status that the same human
would command as an adult. That being has a human essence
that makes certain functions possible, and allows the being to
retain a personal identity through change. °7 Humans may lose
the ability to think critically, but as long as they stay alive they
remain themselves because they have a human nature. The un-
derlying essence of a thing, not its functional abilities, tells us
what kind of being it is. We function as people because we are
people.
So where has all of this personhood analysis led us? A civi-
lized culture would recognize the immorality of killing people
for medical research purposes. For scientific and philosophical
reasons, it seems abundantly clear that the preborn, including
embryos, are people. Therefore, killing the preborn for medical
research purposes is immoral.
Pro-life advocate Scott Klusendorf summarizes these argu-
ments better than perhaps anyone else:
Scientifically, the [pre]born come from human parents
who, according to the law of biogenesis, can only pro-
duce human offspring. Philosophically, the differences
105 Cf Peter Kreeft, Human Personhood, ALL ABOUT IssuEs, Jan.-Feb. 1992,
at 29 (questioning whether the "level of ability to perform certain human acts define
the value of a person").
106 Scott B. Rae & Paul M. Cox, BIoETHics: A CHRISTIAN APPROACH IN A
PLURALISTIC AGE 169 n.13 (1999).
107 Id. at 159-69.
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between fetus and newborn are differences of function,
not essence (or nature). The unborn human retains its
identity as a person through time and change because it
possesses a human nature. Consequently, destructive
embryo research is a serious moral wrong. It strips the
unborn human of its inherent dignity and treats it as a
disposable instrument to be used for someone else's
benefit. A decent and civilized society cannot tolerate
such an act.
108
VIII. EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH IS
SCIENTIFICALLY UNNECESSARY
There may be little hope of changing the minds of those
who will not even entertain the thought of granting personhood
to the preborn. Yet one final attempt will be made to sway those
who are not completely convinced by the arguments in favor of
embryonic personhood, but are willing to consider other evi-
dence. Specifically, this Note will show that ESCR is not neces-
sary in light of recent scientific discoveries concerning stem
cells taken from non-embryonic sources. In fact, it may even
pose a threat to patients who accept implanted cells.
Stem cells can be isolated from sources other than embryos
or fetal tissue. Modern medicine has long known that stem cells
are scattered throughout the bodies of adult mammals. Until re-
cently, medical authorities were unable to isolate these adult
stem cells, and conventional wisdom held that each type of stem
cell could do no more than produce its own kind of cell (e.g.,
marrow stem cells could only produce bone marrow and blood
cells, nerve stem cells could only produce nerve cells, muscle
stem cells could only produce muscle cells, etc.). 10 9
Shortly after the embryonic stem cell breakthrough in 1998,
researchers successfully applied similar techniques to the quest
for transplantable quantities of adult stem cells. Pro-life advo-
cates funded and encouraged this research as an alternative to
killing embryos. Over the past two years, embryonic stem cell
researchers routinely claimed that their research held more
10 8 Klusendorf, supra note 100, at 40.
109 This was until Thomson and colleague's research. See Thomson et al.,
supra note 5, at 1145 (reporting success in isolating human embryonic stem cells
which have the ability to differentiate into endodermic, mesodermic and ectodermic
tissue).
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promise that adult stem cell research, but that position is no
longer tenable.
In its online Stem Cell Primer, the NIH argues in favor of
focusing its funding on ESCR rather than on adult stem cell re-
search.11 It begins by arguing that stem cells from adult hu-
mans have not been isolated for all tissues of the body. 111 While
technically true, the statement needs clarification because this
will not necessarily continue forever. Stem cell research has
proceeded at fantastic speeds over the past few years, so this
objection seems shortsighted at best, and the NIH also fails to
offer compelling reasons why researchers probing the mysteries
of adult stem cells must wait to exploit their findings until all
210 types of adult tissue can be reproduced using their tech-
niques. Until they start the research, they will never know
whether they can reach this magic number.
The NIH argues in favor of ESCR on other faulty grounds,
as well. For example, it claims that adult stem cells exist only in
minute quantities, are difficult to "isolate and purify," and the
number of stem cells available in any given adult's body may
decrease with advancing age.112
But according to researchers, these arguments have been
overtaken by events. 11 3 Researchers have isolated adult stem
cells from the nervous system,1 14 from muscle, 115 from the ret-
116 117 118ina and cornea of the eye, from the pancreas, from bone
11 See NIH PRIMER, supra note 2.
"1 Id.
1id.
113 See Deborah Josefson, Adult Stem Cells May be Redefinable, 318 BRIT.
MED. J. 282 (1999) (reporting findings that indicate that adult neural stem cells can
de-differentiate themselves as haemopoietic precursors), available at http://bmj.com
cgi/reprint/31817179/282/b.pdf.
114 Theo D. Palmer et al., Progenitor Cells from Human Brain After Death,
411 NATURE 42 (2001); Stefano F. Pagano et al., Isolation and Characterization of
Neural Stem Cells from the Adult Human Olfactory Bulb, 18 STEM CELLS 295 (2000).
115 See Philippe Menasch6 et al., Myoblast Transplantation for Heart Failure,
357 LANCEr 279 (2001).
116 Vincent Tropepe et al., Retinal Stem Cells in the Adult Mammalian Eye,
287 Sci. 2032 (2000).
117 Ray Jui-Fang Tsai et al., Reconstruction of Damaged Corneas by Trans-
plantation of Autologous Limbal Epithelial Cells, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 86, 86
(2000) (presenting a study where researchers reconstructed damaged corneas with
adult stem cells); Kazuo Tsubota et al., Treatment of Severe Ocular Surface Disor-
ders With Corneal Epithelial Stem-Cell Transplantation, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1697
(1999).
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marrow and peripheral blood, 19 from endothelial cells in blood
vessels, 12  from fat, 121 from dental pulp, 12  from spermatogo-
nia,123 and even from the placenta124 and the umbilical cord. 25
Neural stem cells from adult mammals can develop into a broad
range of tissue types, and may potentially be used for transplan-
tation in treating different diseases.
12 6
Other researchers injected neural stem cells from adult
mice into chick embryos and mouse embryos. The cells gener-
ated brain cells, spinal cord cells, lung cells, stomach cells, liver
cells, intestinal cells, and heart cells. Although this procedure
did not generate blood cells, another study the authors cited
showed adult neural stem cells can grow into blood cells if in-
jected into irradiated adult mice.r 27 A second cited study
showed marrow stromal cells (adult bone marrow stem cells)
18 Va1l'y Gmyr et al., Adult Human Cytokeratin 19-Positive Cells Reexpress
Insulin Promoter Factor in Vitro: Further Evidence for Pluripotent Pancreatic Stem
Cells in Humans, 49 DIBETEs 1671 (2000); Susan Bonner-Weir et al., In Vitro Cul-
tivation of Human Islets from Expanded Ductal Tissue, 97 PRoc. NATL. ACAD. Sci.
U.S. AM. 7999 (2000).
119 A. A. Kocher et al., Neovascularization of Ischemic Myocardium by Hu-
man Bone Marrow-Derived Angioblasts Prevents Cardiomyocyte Apoptosis, Reduces
Remodeling and Improves Cardiac Function, 7 NATURE MED. 430 (2001).
120 Takayuki Asahara et al., Isolation of Putative Progenitor Endothelial Cells
for Angiogenesis, 275 ScI. 964 (1997).
121 Patricia A. Zuk et al., Multilineage Cells from Human Adipose Tissue:
Implications for Cell-Based Therapies, 7 TissuEENG'G 211 (2001).
122 S. Gronthos et al., Postnatal Human Dental Pulp Stem Cells (DPSCs) In
Vitro and In Vivo, 97 PROC. NAT'L. AcAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 13625 (2000).
123 Fariborz Izadyar et al., Spermatogonial Stem Cell Transplantation, 169
MOLECULAR CELL ENDOCRINOLOGY 21 (2000); Daniel S. Johnston et al., Advances in
Spermatogonial Stem Cell Transplantation, 5 REv. REPROD. 183 (2000).
124 Press Release, Anthrogenesis Corp., Anthrogen Discovery Utilizes Pla-
centa as Source of New Multi-Potent Stem Cell (Apr. 11, 2001), http://www.mcpf.
org/AnthroGen%20Discovery.htm. AnthroGen has also posted articles based on that
press release. See Anne Harding, Anthrogenenis Corp., Anthrogen Announces Break-
through in Recovering Human Stem Cells (Apr. 12, 1999), available at http://www.
anthrogenesis.com/page4l1559.htm.
'25 AScribe Newswire, Umbilical Cord Blood Cells Are Potential Sources of
Universal Brain Repair Tissue, Researcher Reports (May 9, 2001), available at
http://www.ascribe.org/cgi-bin/spew4th.pl?fname=200105/20010509.130459&time=
14:33+Pacific+Time&year=2001&public=l.
126 See Diana L. Clarke et al., Generalized Potential of Adult Neural Stem
Cells, 288 ScI. 1660 (2000).
127 See Christopher R. R. Bjomson et al., Turning Brain into Blood: A Hema-
topoietic Fate Adopted by Adult Neural Stem Cells in Vivo, 283 SCI. 534 (1999) (dis-
cussing stem cell transplantation into irradiated hosts).
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can become astrocytes, a type of brain cell. 128 Two other cited
studies indicated hematopoietic cells (adult blood stem cells)
can produce myocytes (muscle cells), and muscle progenitor
cells (adult muscle stem cells) can generate blood cells. IM
Transplanted bone marrow stem cells from adult mammals
can generate liver cells in response to an injury. In one study,
adult rats with injured livers were successfully treated with
bone marrow stem cell implants. 130
Ironically, a recent NIH-funded peer-reviewed study has
proven that stem cells from adult human bone marrow have the
ability to develop into bone cells, cartilage, fat, muscle tissue,
and nerve cells. ral The study produced an adequate supply of
cells for transplantation six weeks after withdrawing the mar-
row stem cells with a syringe. 132 The NIH's Stem Cell Primer
web page omits any reference to this study. Researchers at
Osiris Therapeutics and the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine
duplicated the feat. 133 Irony again-Johns Hopkins is home to
ESCR maverick John Gearhart.
The Journal of Neuroscience Research reported other im-
pressive results. According to one of its studies, stem cells from
128 Gene C. Kopen et al., Marrow Stromal Cells Migrate Throughout Fore-
brain and Cerebellum, and They Differentiate Into Astrocytes After Injection Into
Neonatal Mouse Brains, 96 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 10711 (1999).
129 See Emanuela Gussoni et al., Dystrophin Expression in the MDX Mouse
Restored by Stem Cell Transplantation, 401 NATURE 390 (1999); Kathyjo Ann Jack-
son et al., Hematopoietic Potential of Stem Cells Isolated from Murine Skeletal Mus-
cle, 96 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. ScI. U.S.A. 14482 (1999).
130 B. E. Petersen et al., Bone Marrow as a Potential Source of Hepatic Oval
Cells, 284 SCI. 1168 (1999).
131 David C. Colter et al., Rapid Expansion of Recycling Stem Cells in Cul-
tures of Plastic-Adherent Cells from Human Bone Marrow, 97 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
Sci. U.S.A. 3213, 3213 (2000).
132 See id.; see also NAT'L INST. OF ARTHRITIS AND MUSCOSKELETAL AND
SKIN DISEASE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., UNLMITED HARVEST OF
STEM CELLS FROM BONE MARROW POSSIBLE NIAMS-SUPPORTED STUDY (n.d.),
http:llwww.nih.gov/niams/news/spotlight/stemcells.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2001)
(describing the study wherein a new protocol for the production of unlimited stem
cells has been developed).
133 See Mark F. Pittenger et al., Multilineage Potential of Adult Human Mes-
enchymal Stem Cells, 284 Sci. 143, 143 n.1 (1999), see also Ricki Lewis, Human
Mesenchymal Stem Cells Differentiate in the Lab, THE SCIENTIST, Apr. 12, 1999,
http:llwww.the-scientist.comlyrl999/aprllewispl-990412.html (indicating that re-
searchers at Osiris Therapeutics and the John Hopkins University School of Medicine
coaxed human mesenchymal stem cells from adults' bone marrow to develop into
cartilage, fat, and bone cells, in vitro).
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adult human bone marrow can be coaxed into becoming brain
cells.' 34 Researchers said human marrow stem cells can be "dif-
ferentiated into neurons ... Consequently, adult marrow stro-
mal cells ... may constitute an abundant and accessible cellular
reservoir for the treatment of a variety of neurologic dis-
eases."'
135
According to a recent article in the Wall Street Journal,
adult stem cells "may prove much more useful to medical sci-
ence" than embryonic cells:
Scientists used to think that such potential for cel-
lular regeneration was present only in embryos-that,
for example, humans had made their lifetime supply of
brain cells by age 17. But that canon is steadily erod-
ing....
"I think we will find these stem cells in any organ
that we look," said Harvard Medical School researcher
Evan Y. Snyder.
136
University of Pennsylvania researcher Dr. Louis P. Bucky's
team harvested stem cells from abdominal fat, exposed them to
growth factors that promote bone development, and were able to
create bone cells. 13Dr. Prosper Benhaim, of the University of
California, and his team grew cartilage cells from fat stem cells
taken from liposuction samples.
138
Researchers from the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of
Medical Research in Melbourne, Australia, located the actual
source of adult neural stem cells in mouse brains, and extracted
samples of eighty percent purity.139 The scientific world's pre-
vious best efforts yielded roughly five percent purity by sifting
through entire brains without a lock on the source of the
134 Dale Woodbury et al., Adult Rat and Human Bone Marrow Stromal Cells
Differentiate Into Neurons, 61 J. NEuROSCI. REs. 347, 364-70 (2000).
135 Id. at 364.
136 Laura Johannes, Adult Stem Cells Have Advantage Battling Disease,
WALL ST. J., Apr.13, 1999, atB1.
137 See Press Release, Plastic Surgery Information Service, Plastic Surgery
Procedures Provide New Sources for Stem Cell Development (Oct. 16, 2000), at
http:llwww.plasticsurgery.org/mediactr/StemCells.htm.
138 See id.
139 Rodney L. Rietze et al., Purification of a Pluripotent Neural Stem Cell
from the Adult Mouse Brain, 412 NATURE 736 (2001).
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cells. 140 When researchers apply variations on this technique to
other sources, high-purity adult stem cell supplies will increase,
allowing ever more clinical trials with ever more subjects, out-
stripping the "need" for embryonic stem cells from the sixty or
so lines identified.
Last, the NIH also argues that stem cells taken from a pa-
tient's own body would be useless for treating genetic diseases,
since the stem cells would likely carry the same genes as the
diseased adult cells. 141 This objection dissolves if doctors sim-
ply use compatible stem cells from a different consenting adult.
To keep track of the rapid advances in adult stem cell re-
search, check the World Wide Web sites of the Coalition of
Americans for Research Ethics 142 or the Center for Bioethicsand Human Dignity. 143
IX. A CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?
Although adult stem cell research appears very promising,
scientists stumbled onto a down side of embryonic stem cell
implants earlier this year. Implanting fetal cells can be very haz-
ardous to one's health and quality of life.
A study that tried to treat Parkinson's disease by implanting
fetal cells into patients' brains not only failed to help but also
caused horrifying writhing and jerking in about fifteen percent
of patients. Fetal cells apparently grew too well in these pa-
tients, and there appears to be no way to remove or deactivate
them. 145
140 See id. at 736 (indicating that the source of these neural cells is not clear).
141 NIH PRIMER, supra note 2.
142 Their web site is http://www.stemcellresearch.org; See also Do No HARM:
THE COALITION OF AMERICANS FOR RESEARCH ETHICS, CURRENT CLINICAL APPLICA-
TIONS OF ADULT STEM CELLS (providing a current bibliography of resources), at
http://www.stemcellresearch.org/info/currentaps.pdf (last modified June 25, 2001).
143 Their web site is http://www.cbhd.org.
144 Gina Kolata, Parkinson's Research Is Set Back By Failure of Fetal Cell
Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at Al; But see Curt R. Freed et al, Transplanta-
tion of Embryonic Dopamine Neurons for Severe Parkinson's Disease, 344 NEW
ENG. J. MED 710 (2001) (indicating that transplantation of embryonic dopamine
neurons into the brains of patients with Parkinson's disease resulted in some clinical
benefit in younger but not in older patients). This study was controversial not only
because it used tissue from aborted fetuses but also because it involved "sham' sur-
gery" in the control group. Id.
145 Kolata, supra note 144, at Al.
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Dr. Paul E. Greene, a neurologist at the Columbia Univer-
sity College of Physicians and Surgeons and a researcher in the
study, described the results as 'absolutely devastating. They
chew constantly, their fingers go up and down, their wrists flex
and distend[; they] writhe and twist, jerk their heads, fling their
arms about.... It's a real nightmare. And we can't selectively
turn it off." 1
46
One man jerked so badly that he required a feeding tube,
Dr. Greene said, and another suffered garbled speech as the
jerking came and went unpredictably. 147
Dr. William Weiner, the director of the Maryland Parkin-
son's Disease and Movement Disorder Center and a professor of
neurology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine in
Baltimore, put it well: "The bottom line for patients is that hu-
man fetal cell transplants are not currently the best way to go. If
you are willing to pay for them, you can still have them done.
But my advice is you ought not to do this."'
148
If fetal cells pose such sobering risks, how much more do
we risk by implanting more potent embryonic cells? When the
potential cure turns out to be worse than the disease, scientists
must redirect their efforts to more promising avenues of re-
search.
It is hoped this Note has presented enough scientific evi-
dence 149 to make possible an informed decision about the al-
leged necessity of human ESCR.
X. DECISION TIME
American society must make two separate decisions. We
must decide whether human embryos are people, and we must
decide whether to allocate federal funds for human embryonic
stem cell research. We would be wise to consider the conse-
quences of the resulting four options.
If the federal government funds ESCR, and if embryos are
not people, many people suffering from serious medical condi-
tions may someday be treated effectively. This is the position
146 Id.
147 id.
148 id.
149 For further evidence that adult stem cell research is worth pursuing, see
APPENDIx B.
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taken by the NIH and is likely to be followed by uninformed
courts.
If the federal government reallocates funding to adult stem
cell research, and if embryos are not people, society will forego
whatever marginal benefits it could have gained by working
with embryos. As this Note has shown, these marginal benefits
are quickly shrinking to insignificance under pressure from re-
cent scientific discoveries.
If the federal government funds ESCR, and if embryos are
people, society will be seeking to prolong the lives of its older
members by "consuming" its younger members. Clearly this
option is unacceptable in a civilized society.
Lastly, if the federal government reallocates funding to
adult stem cell research, and if embryos are people, then society
will forego whatever marginal benefits it could have gained by
working with embryos, but will have saved thousands of lives.
At a minimum, a civilized society would agree on utilitarian
grounds that it is better for the sick and the injured to forego
treatment than to pursue the tainted benefits of deadly medical
research.
XI. CONCLUSION
Under present federal law, an effective case can be made
for the illegality of federally funded embryonic stem cell re-
search. This is so because the congressional ban has survived all
repeal attempts to date, and the NIH attempt to create a loop-
hole in the ban fails when examined in the light of accepted
rules of statutory construction. As long as the ban remains in
force and in its current form, the legal debate is over-unless
and until the federal courts explicitly rule it unconstitutional.
Pro-life advocates need not be convinced that ESCR is im-
moral. Likewise, there is great difficulty in convincing the op-
posite side to change its position. There is hope that the law of
biogenesis, the "SLED test," and an intellectually honest ex-
amination of the flaws inherent in functionalism will persuade
the undecided reader that embryos should be considered people
under the law. It is hoped that enough people will agree to tip
the balance in favor of the pro-life view. At a minimum, intel-
lectually honest judges will be compelled to agree that the pre-
born are people.
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The doubtful reader in need of more evidence need look no
further than the mass of medical research conducted in the last
three years. Scientifically speaking, recent advances in adult
stem cell research demonstrate conclusively that ESCR is cer-
tainly not necessary for medical researchers to explore exciting
new treatments for chronic medical conditions.
Surely we should conduct medical research that does not
kill human beings, rather than using federal funds to encourage
research that is arguably equivalent to murder. Federally funded
human ESCR is illegal, immoral, and unnecessary. As Scott
Klusendorf says, "we can treat the sick without killing the vul-
nerable.", 15
0
'
0 Kusendorf, supra note 100, at 2.
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APPENDIX A
STATE STATUTES ON FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH
FLORIDA
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(6) (West Supp. 2001)
Experimentation on fetus prohibited; exception
No person shall use any live fetus or live, premature infant for
any type of scientific, research, laboratory, or other kind of ex-
perimentation either prior to or subsequent to any termination of
pregnancy procedure except as necessary to protect or preserve
the life and health of such fetus or premature infant.
LOUISIANA
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 2000)
Uses of human embryo in vitro
The use of a human ovum fertilized in vitro is solely for the
support and contribution of the complete development of human
in utero implantation. No in vitro fertilized human ovum will be
farmed or cultured solely for research purposes or any other
purposes. The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human ovum, or
human embryo is expressly prohibited.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West 2000)
Capacity
An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical per-
son until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted
in the womb; or at any other time when rights attach to an un-
born child in accordance with law.
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MAINE
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992)
Sale and use of fetuses
Whoever shall use, transfer, distribute or give away any
live human fetus, whether intrauterine or extrauterine, or any
product of conception considered live born for scientific ex-
perimentation or for any form of experimentation shall be pun-
ished by a fine of not more than $5,000 and by imprisonment
for not more than 5 years and any person consenting, aiding or
assisting shall be liable to like punishment.
MASSACHUSETTS
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a) (West 1996)
Experimentation on human fetuses prohibited; medical pro-
cedures authorized; consent; approval; civil and criminal
liability and proceedings; severability
(a) I. No person shall use any live human fetus whether before
or after expulsion from its mother's womb, for scientific, labo-
ratory, research or other kind of experimentation. This section
shall not prohibit procedures incident to the study of a human
fetus while it is in its mother's womb, provided that in the best
medical judgment of the physician, made at the time of the
study, said procedures do not substantially jeopardize the life or
health of the fetus, and provided said fetus is not the subject of
a planned abortion. In any criminal proceeding a fetus shall be
conclusively presumed not to be the subject of a planned abor-
tion if the mother signed a written statement at the time of the
study, that she was not planning an abortion.
This section shall not prohibit or regulate diagnostic or re-
medial procedures the purpose of which is to determine the life
or health of the fetus involved or to preserve the life or health of
the fetus involved or the mother involved.
A fetus is a live fetus for purposes of this section when, in
the best medical judgment of a physician, it shows evidence of
life as determined by the same medical standards as are used in
determining evidence of life in a spontaneously aborted fetus at
approximately the same stage of gestational development.
2002]
HEALTH MATRIX
(a)lI. No person shall perform or offer to perform an abortion
where part or all of the consideration for said performance is
that the fetal remains may be used for experimentation or other
kind of research or study.
(a)IV. No person shall knowingly sell, transfer, distribute or
give away any fetus for a use which is in violation of the provi-
sions of this section. For purposes of this section, the word "fe-
tus" shall include also ,an embryo or neonate.
(a)V. Except as hereafter provided, whoever violates the provi-
sions of this section shall be punished by imprisonment in a jail
or house of correction for not less than one year nor more than
two and one-half years or by imprisonment in the state prison
for not more than five years and by the imposition of a fine of
up to ten thousand dollars.
MICHIGAN
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2001)
Human research; use of human embryo, fetus or neonate
(1) A person shall not use a live human embryo, fetus, or neo-
nate for nontherapeutic research if, in the best judgment of the
person conducting the research, based upon the available
knowledge or information at the approximate time of the re-
search, the research substantially jeopardizes the life or health
of the embryo, fetus, or neonate. Nontherapeutic research shall
not in any case be performed on an embryo or fetus known by
the person conducting the research to be the subject of a
planned abortion being performed for any purpose other than to
protect the life of the mother.
(2) For purposes of subsection (1) the embryo or fetus shall be
conclusively presumed not to be the subject of a planned abor-
tion if the mother signed a written statement at the time of the
research, that she was not planning an abortion.
MINNESOTA
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1998)
Experimentation or sale
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Subdivision 1. Penalty. Whoever uses or permits the use of a
living human conceptus for any type of scientific, laboratory
research or other experimentation except to protect the life or
health of the conceptus, or except as herein provided, shall be
guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Subd. 2. Permitted act. The use of a living human conceptus
for research or experimentation which verifiable scientific evi-
dence has shown to be harmless to the conceptus shall be per-
mitted.
Subd. 3. Penalty; permitted payments. Whoever buys or sells
a living human conceptus or nonrenewable organ of the body is
guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision pro-
hibits (1) the buying and selling of a cell culture line or lines
taken from a nonliving human conceptus; (2) payments for rea-
sonable expenses associated with the removal, storage, and
transportation of a human organ, including payments made to or
on behalf of a living organ donor for actual expenses such as
medical costs, lost income, or travel expenses that are incurred
as a direct result of the donation of the nonrenewable organ; or
(3) financial assistance payments provided under insurance and
[M]edicare reimbursement programs.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (1994)
Restrictions on Use of Preembryos
I. No preembryo shall be maintained ex utero in the noncryo-
preserved state beyond 14 days post-fertilization development.
II. No preembryo that has been donated for use in research shall
be transferred to a uterine cavity.
NORTH DAKOTA
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 (1997).
Live fetal experimentation - Penalty
1. A person may not use any live human fetus, whether before
or after expulsion from its mother's womb, for scientific, labo-
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ratory, research, or other kind of experimentation. This section
does not prohibit procedures incident to the study of a human
fetus while it is in its mother's womb, provided that in the best
medical judgment of the physician, made at the time of the
study, the procedures do not substantially jeopardize the life or
health of the fetus, and provided the fetus is not the subject of a
planned abortion. In any criminal proceeding the fetus is con-
clusively presumed not to be the subject of a planned abortion if
the mother signed a written statement at the time of the study,
that the mother was not planning an abortion.
2. A person may not use a fetus or newborn child, or any tissue
or organ thereof, resulting from an induced abortion in animal
or human research, experimentation, or study, or for animal or
human transplantation.
3. This section does not prohibit or regulate diagnostic or reme-
dial procedures, the purpose of which is to determine the life or
health of the fetus involved or to preserve the life or health of
the fetus involved, or of the mother involved.
4. A fetus is a live fetus for the purposes of this section when, in
the best medical judgment of a physician, it shows evidence of
life as determined by the same medical standards as are used in
determining evidence of life in a spontaneously aborted fetus at
approximately the same stage of gestational development.
5. Any person violating this section is guilty of a class A felony.
OHIO
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (West 2001)
Abortion trafficking
(A) No person shall experiment upon or sell the product of hu-
man conception which is aborted. Experiment does not include
autopsies pursuant to sections 313.13 and 2108.50 of the Re-
vised Code.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of abortion traffick-
ing, a misdemeanor of the first degree.
PENNSYLVANIA
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (West 2001)
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Fetal experimentation
(a) Unborn or live child.-Any person who knowingly per-
forms any type of nontherapeutic experimentation or nonthera-
peutic medical procedure (except an abortion as defined in this
chapter) upon any unborn child, or upon any child born alive
during the course of an abortion, commits a felony of the third
degree. "Nontherapeutic" means that which is not intended to
preserve the life or health of the child upon whom it is per-
formed.
(b) Dead child.- The following standards govern the procure-
ment and use of any fetal tissue or organ which is used in ani-
mal or human transplantation, research or experimentation:
(1) No fetal tissue or organs may be procured or used with-
out the written consent of the mother. No consideration of
any kind for such consent may be offered or given. Further,
if the tissue or organs are being derived from abortion, such
consent shall be valid only if obtained after the decision to
abort has been made.
(2) No person who provides the information required by
section 3205 (relating to informed consent) shall employ
the possibility of the use of aborted fetal tissue or organs as
an inducement to a pregnant woman to undergo abortion
except that payment for reasonable expenses occasioned by
the actual retrieval, storage, preparation and transportation
of the tissues is permitted.
(3) No remuneration, compensation or other consideration
may be paid to any person or organization in connection
with the procurement of fetal tissue or organs.
(4) All persons who participate in the procurement, use or
transplantation of fetal tissue or organs, including the re-
cipients of such tissue or organs, shall be informed as to
whether the particular tissue or organ involved was pro-
cured as a result of either:
(i) stillbirth;
(ii) miscarriage;
(iii) ectopic pregnancy;
(iv) abortion; or
(v) any other means.
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(5) No person who consents to the procurement or use of
any fetal tissue or organ may designate the recipient of that
tissue or organ, nor shall any other person or organization
act to fulfill that designation.
(6) The department may assess a civil penalty upon any
person who procures, sells or uses any fetal tissue or organs
in violation of this section or the regulations issued there-
under. Such civil penalties may not exceed $5,000 for each
separate violation. In assessing such penalties, the depart-
ment shall give due consideration to the gravity of the vio-
lation, the good faith of the violator and the history of pre-
vious violations. Civil penalties due under this paragraph
shall be paid to the department for deposit in the State
Treasury and may be enforced by the department in the
Commonwealth Court.
(c) Construction of Section.-Nothing in this section shall be
construed to condone or prohibit the performance of diagnostic
tests while the unborn child is in utero or the performance of
pathological examinations on an aborted child. Nor shall any-
thing in this section be construed to condone or prohibit the per-
formance of in vitro fertilization and accompanying embryo
transfer.
RHODE ISLAND
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (2000)
Experimentation on human fetuses
(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Fetus" includes an embryo or neonate;
(2) "Live fetus" means a fetus that, in the best medical
judgment of a physician, shows evidence of life as deter-
mined by the same medical standards as are used in deter-
mining evidence of life in a spontaneously aborted fetus at
approximately the same stage of gestational development.
(b) No person shall use any live human fetus, whether before or
after expulsion from its mother's womb, for scientific, labora-
tory research, or other kind of experimentation. This section
does not prohibit procedures incident to the study of a human
fetus while it is in its mother's womb, provided that in the best
medical judgment of the physician, made at the time of the
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study, the procedures do not substantially jeopardize the life or
health of the fetus, and provided the fetus is not the subject of a
planned abortion. In any criminal proceeding the fetus is con-
clusively presumed not to be the subject of a planned abortion if
the mother signed a written statement at the time of the study
that she was not planning an abortion.
(c) This section does not prohibit or regulate diagnostic or re-
medial procedures, the purpose of which are to determine or to
preserve the life or health of the fetus involved or the mother
involved.
(d) No experimentation may knowingly be performed upon a
dead fetus unless the consent of its mother has first been ob-
tained. This consent shall not be required in the case of a rou-
tine pathological study. In any criminal proceeding, consent
shall be conclusively presumed to have been granted for the
purposes of this section by a written statement, signed by the
mother, who is at least eighteen (18) years of age, to the effect
that she consents to the use of her fetus for scientific, labora-
tory, research, or other kind of experimentation or study. This
written consent shall constitute lawful authorization for the
transfer of the dead fetus.
(e) No person shall perform or offer to perform an abortion
where part or all of the consideration for the performance is that
the fetal remains may be used for experimentation or other
kinds of research or study.
(f) No person shall knowingly sell, transfer, distribute, or give
away any fetus for a use which is in violation of the provisions
of this section.
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APPENDIX B
RECENT DISCOVERIES IN ADULT STEM CELL
RESEARCH
The British Medical Journal weighed in on adult stem cell
research early last year, saying, "[e]arly results suggest that
ductal tissue taken from human cadavers can be grown in cul-
ture to form functioning [pancreatic] islet cells. Such a source
of tissue ... could prove better than relying on fetal tissue, and
may even lead eventually to autologous pancreatic trans-
plants.' 51
Researchers have found that bone marrow stem cells from
children and adults can "become brain cells and liver cell pre-
cursors, plus all three kinds of muscle-heart, skeletal and
smooth.... Besides skirting the ethical dilemmas surrounding
research on embryonic and fetal stem cells, adult cells ... might
have another advantage: They may be easier to manage."
152
Science Magazine reported, "the adult central nervous sys-
tem, long thought not to contain cells capable of dividing, in
fact harbors stem cells. Such cells may help treat Alzheimer's
and Parkinson's disease. In addition . . . hematopoietic stem
cells from bone marrow may one day provide transplants to re-
place blood and immune cells."'
153
Reporting on March 2000 news that scientists have cured
diabetes in mice using adult pancreatic stem cells, the Alliance
for Aging Research called this "the most promising sign to date
that stem cell research might yield remarkable treatments for
currently incurable diseases."'154
Another peer-reviewed article explained that adult stem
cells are now turning out to have greater than expected
151 Abi Berger, Transplanted Pancreatic Stem Cells Can Reverse Diabetes in
Mice, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 736, (2000), available at http://bmj.com/cgi/reprint/320/
7237/736/a.pdf.
152 Gretchen Vogel, Can Old Cells Learn New Tricks?, 287 SCi. 1418, 1419
(2000).
153 Pamela J. Hines et al., Stem Cells Branch Out, 287 SCl. 1418, 1418 (2000).
1'4 Online NewsHour, Stem Cell Debate (May 24, 2000), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/july-dec0O/genome._8-24.html.
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capabilities. What's more, they pose fewer ethical prob-
lems because they can be obtained from sources other
than embryos or aborted fetuses. And the companies us-
ing them argue that it may require less work to trans-
form them into specialized cells for transplantation.
155
The fact that nerve stem cells "can de-differentiate and re-
invent themselves" as blood-producing stem cells "means that
the need for fetal cells as a source of stem cells for medical re-
search may soon be eclipsed by the more readily available and
less controversial adult stem cells."'156
Recent research shows that mesenchymal stem cells in adult
bone marrow "can in principle be used to repair bone, cartilage,
tendon and many other injured or aged tissues. The cells would
be derived in many cases from the patient's own bone marrow
and thus present no problem of immune rejection."' 157
Due to advances in the use of the anti-aging enzyme telom-
erase, "the ability to rejuvenate specific cells in the body opens
up a dazzling array of possibilities. Doctors could grow skin
grafts for burn victims using their own skin, insulin-producing
cells for diabetics, or muscle tissue for sufferers of muscular
dystrophy."'158
"'This suggests that there is a stem cell in the adult bone
marrow that is capable of becoming anything if you give it the
right signal'. . . .,
A California researcher commented on new ways to "regen-
erate" and transplant patients' own brain cells to treat Parkin-
son's and other diseases: 'What we have is a protocol in which
we don't have to harvest 12 or 15 fetuses, we don't have to give
immunosuppressant therapy, and we don't have to worry about
viral disease transmission .... ,60
155 Eliot Marshall, The Business of Stem Cells, 287 Sci. 1419, 1420 (2000).
156 Josefson, supra note 113, at 282.
157 Nicholas Wade, Discovery Bolsters a Hope for Regeneration, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 1999, at A18.
s' Ruth Larson, Scientists Find New Life for Old Cells: Rejuvenated Tissue
CouldAid Burn Victims, Fend off Wrinkles, WAsH. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1998, at Al.
159 Associated Press, Researchers Find Stem Cell That Makes New Liver Tis-
sue (May 14, 1999), available at http://www.cjga.com/Health9905/14_liver.html.
160 Mark Moran, For Cell Transplants, Is One Brain Better Than Two?, AM.
MED. NEws, May 3, 1999, at 29.
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For generations, scientific dogma held that the adult
brain cannot repair itself, because it lacks stem cells.
Wrong. Recently, scientists found that adult brains do
indeed harbor stem cells ....
Since stem cells divide endlessly, a single sample
started from a human fetus could provide all that's
needed. But the recipient's immune system might attack
these as foreign. Perhaps the patient's own body is a
better source of stem cells.
[Moreover], brain stem cells may not be a necessary in-
gredient for custom-making new brain tissue. Scientists
believe it may be possible to reprogram more readily
available kinds of stem cells, such as the ones that pro-
duce skin, so that they will chum out brain cells, in-
stead. 161
Researchers at McGill University isolated stem cells from
the skin of adult rodents that can become neurons, glia, smooth
muscle cells, and fat cells. Human studies have indicated that
similar cells are present in adult human skin.162
Researchers in Britain have added another talent to adult
stem cells' growing repertoire, announcing that such
cells taken from bone marrow can develop into kidney
cells.
161 Daniel Q. Haney, Scientists Try to Grow Brain Parts (May 1, 1999),
available at http://www.myelitis.orgltmiclarchive/26/0046.html.
162 Jean G. Toma et al., Isolation of Multipotent Adult Stem Cells from the
Dermis of Mammalian Skin, 3 NATuRE CELL BIOLOGY 778, 782 (2001), available at
http:/www.nature.com/cgi-taf/DynaPage.taffile/ncbjournaYv3/n9full/ncb090l_
778.html&filetype=pdf.
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The UK team examined kidney biopsy tissue from eight
male transplant recipients who had received kidneys
from female donors. Many cells from the transplanted
kidneys contained a Y chromosome, which only appears
in males, indicating the cells must have originated
within the male transplant recipients.
This does not prove directly that the kidney cells came
from bone marrow stem cells, but that is the most plau-
sible explanation, says team member Richard Poulsom.
He and his colleagues did a parallel study in mice that
backs that interpretation.1 63
Researchers apparently found an effective treatment for a
man with scleromyxedema, a rare and potentially fatal skin dis-
ease. They reported his condition as in "complete remission"
and that he "is doing well" after transplanting adult stem cells
taken from his own bone marrow.64 Prior to the adult stem cell
treatment, the patient could not completely close his eyes, and
had lost the ability to eat. Three months after treatment the pa-
tient could once again close his eyes and open his mouth to
eat.1
65
163 Greg Miller, Adult Stem Cell Talents Grow (July 25, 2001), at http://www.
newscientist.connews/news.jsp?id--ns99991068.
164 Adrienne M. Feasel et al., Complete Remission of Scleromyxedema Fol-
lowing Autologous Stem Cell Transplantation, 137 ARcHIVES DERMATOLOGY 1071,
1072 (2001).
165 Id. at 1071.

